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I. THE BELL DECREE AND THE CORPORATIST MINDSET
In this short Article, I shall return to some of the issues that I

addressed in my short book, Antitrust Consent Decrees in Theory and
Practice: Why Less is More.' The basic theme of that book is that the
success of consent decrees, and indeed the resolution of all large antitrust
cases, follows a clear pattern. The more ambitious the decree, the worse
matters are likely to turn out. The reasonable response therefore is to cut
back on ambition in order to execute modest plans well. Perhaps the most
vivid illustration of a consent decree process gone wrong is the breakup of
AT&T.2 Therefore, holding a conference that addresses the strengths and
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Visiting
Professor, NYU Law School. My thanks to Paul Laskow, NYU Law School, Class of 2009.
1. RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTIrrRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
WHY LESS IS MoRE (2007).

2. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.1982).
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weaknesses of that decree twenty-five years later offers a propitious
occasion on which to examine this fundamental restructuring of the
telecommunications industry.
At the time of its adoption, the 1982 decree was generally lauded as a
rebuke to the old corporatist way of doing business. 3 That system of selfconscious industrial policy dominated New Deal thinking. Its operation
rested on three legs. The first was a strong government willing to create
and preserve monopoly profits. The second was a system of strong labor
unions, bolstered by the protections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4 and
National Labor Relations Act, 5 that shared in those gains. The third was a
corporate and antitrust culture that blessed these accommodations. The
corporate law did not see shareholder maximization as an exclusive goal,
and thus fostered accommodations with labor and other political
constituencies. In addition, the antitrust law often punished competitive
behavior or insulated anticompetitive behavior from judicial scrutiny. This
system offered a cozy comfort to all the participants, and it promised
stability in institutional arrangements that could not have been achieved in
a competitive market where new entry and exit would quickly erase the
monopoly profits for both the firm and its union.6 But the defenders of the
system thought that they had created the vaunted stability long prized by
regulators of all stripes, who seek to insulate their own preferred
constituents from the vicissitudes that plague the rest of the world.
That so-called stability is in fact an illusion by any system-wide
measure. 7 Of course, the regulated industry and its constituents are
3. See Michael Wachter, Labor Unions: A CorporatistInstitution in a Competitive
World, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (2007).
4. Federal Anti-Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2000)).
5. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (2000)).
6. The stabilization theme is highly evident in the National Labor Relations Act,
which reads:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
29 U.S.C. § 151. For an attack on the coherence of these propositions, see RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CoNsTrrtmoN 95-99 (2006).
7. For an early statement of the point, see FIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM
(50th Anniversary ed. 1994). There, the author observes,
What is constantly being done is to grant this kind of security [of a given income]
piecemeal, to this group and to that, with the result that for those who are left out
in the cold the insecurity constantly increases.
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protected against both price fluctuations and new entry. But the model is
not sustainable in the long run for three reasons. First, its ostensible
certainties cannot be replicated system-wide. Uncertainty is an inescapable
feature of all complex social systems. The only question is who will be
forced to bear its consequences. The effort to insulate one group from the
uncertainty increases the level of uncertainty borne by everyone else in the
system, for all the initial variation is now forced on that fraction of the
economy that is denied the protection afforded selectively to the regulated
industry. Thus, if economic circumstances move sharply, these parties will
be forced to bear the price declines in their own industries and to subsidize
the price rigidities in telecommunications. If voluntary markets will tend to
equalize uncertainty at the margin for all sectors, regulation tends to force
greater risks on certain groups to benefit others. The likely consequence is
to prevent the outside groups from making their needed adjustments. They
will be on the steep portion of their uncertainty cost curves. Yet, the
regulated parties will be spared the initial amounts of uncertainty, which
they could probably bear at far lower cost. The result is more uncertainty
system-wide, all in the name of price and income stabilization.
The second risk with these accommodations is that while they insulate
the protected groups from a multitude of small shocks, they do not protect
them from the few large ones that really matter. Constant levels of
protection look good until a large event makes the position of the preferred
players untenable. New entry from some unanticipated corner can topple
the financial base on which these long-term accommodations rest. In
telecommunications, that transformation started with the rise of MCI,
founded in 1963, which offered a way around the Bell monopoly, chiefly
by exploiting the then 8 new technology of transistors, coaxial cable, and
microwave technology.
Third, the members of any industry-steel, automobiles, tires,
agriculture-can try to play the same corporatist strategy. Access to that
combined strategy became easier once labor unions received statutory
monopolies under the National Labor Relations Act, justified, of course, as
a way to "stabilize" the wages and purchasing power of their members. 9

[W]ith every grant of complete security to one group the insecurity of the rest
necessarily increases. If you guarantee to some a fixed part of a variable cake, the
share left to the rest is bound to fluctuate proportionately more than the size of the
whole.
Id. at 137-41. In effect, the preferred recipients enjoy the priority of debt in downtimes and
participate equally as holders of equity in good times. By definition, someone else has to get
a smaller share of what turns out, given the inefficiencies involved, a smaller pie.
8. For discussion, see MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE & PETER W. HUBER,

24-28 (1992).
9. See discussion supra note 6.
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The agricultural price support systems similarly stabilized prices for
farmers but forced the public at large to take the full risk of the price
fluctuations by buying back excess production at inflated prices. It is no
accident that labor and agriculture won exemptions from the antitrust law
under section 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914.10 Nor is it an accident that the
broad expansion of the reach of the federal commerce power took place
first in labor and then in agriculture." State-wide regulation was subject to
too much competitive pressure from other states to succeed. With each
additional maneuver of this sort, system-wide uncertainty increases,
representing yet another distortion of a system of state monopolies. What is
good for the coddled industry is systematically bad for the public at large.
Indeed, there is a grand prisoner's dilemma at work here. It would be better
for all of these cartel-like structures to disband simultaneously, for the
gains that any group got from its own protection were more than offset over
time when firms in other industries successfully imitated their strategy. In
the long run, no one wins as the social pie shrinks. And on the few
occasions where that point was grasped, large moves toward deregulation
were possible. Airline transportation was deregulated in 197812 and surface
transportation was largely deregulated in 1982.13 It is not, therefore,
entirely coincidental that the Bell consent decree dates to 1982, at the
outset of the Reagan years.
The conventional accounts of that decree treat it as yet another nail in
the coffin of the corporatist strategy. In one sense, this proposition must be
regarded as true, given that the architect of the system was the late
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, whose anti-corporatist
sentiments are beyond dispute. But there is good reason in this instance to
think that in some sense he did not quite shed the corporatist heritage. In
part, this is perfectly understandable. The great "achievement" of the New
Deal corporatist state was its uncanny ability to take competitive industries
like agriculture and convert them into grotesque monopolies and cartels
organized and propped up by the government. The most evident move in
that direction was the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Parker v.

10. Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (2000)). The Act states "[t]hat the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help ... " Id.
11. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act); see also Wickard v. Fillbum, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding nationwide restrictions on agricultural production).
12. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
13. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (Highway Improvement Act), Pub.
L. No. 97-424,96 Stat. 2097 (1983).
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Brown, 14 which exempted a state-run raisin cartel from the reach of the
federal antitrust law on the ground that states were entitled to enact their
own industrial policies unless the federal government had intervened to
block their decisions. To be sure, the New Deal marked a huge expansion
in federal power. Yet, at the same time, it must never be forgotten that it
also led to an expansion of state power as well, so long as there was no
clash between the two systems. And to reduce the likelihood of that clash,
the Supreme Court created its "presumption against preemption," which to
this day still increases the risk of dual systems of regulation. I5

II. "DEREGULATION" IN A NETWORK INDUSTRY: Do GREENE
AND BAXTER MIX?
Start with this proposition: the provision of telecommunications
services is not like the production and sale of raisins. Even if pure
competitive markets are possible in agriculture, they are not possible in
telecommunications, notwithstanding the hype in support of this assertion.
Judge Greene, for example, lamented that AT&T was in the worst of both
worlds because "the Bell System has been neither effectively regulated nor
fully subjected to true competition. ' ' 6 This simple observation has
powerful implications for the counterattack against the corporatist
mentality. If there is no good competitive solution for networks, the strong
pro-market intuition may be enough to make the consent decree feasible. It
need not be strong enough to make it work, however, because the only
choice is a different-and hopefully better-form of regulation, not a pure
competitive market.
Optimism, therefore, has to be tempered in light of the restricted set
of feasible alternatives. The minimum requirement for a sound network is
that each person situated at any point on the network be in a position to
communicate with any other person situated on the network. That
problem--universal access-is easily solved under the corporatist model
that animated the old AT&T. If every system user is situated under one
roof, there is no need to decide who should pay what fees to gain access to
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
15. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."). For a defense of
that preemption in the name of federalism, see Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and
State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). For the author's critique of these dual
systems of regulation, see Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction:
Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra, at 1; Richard A. Epstein & Michael
S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine and Its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra,
at 309.
16. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 170 (D.D.C. 1982).
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networks populated by independent firms and their independent customer
bases. All the cross-subsidies are kept internal to a single umbrella firm so
that ratemaking can be separated from the problem of establishing
interconnections. So shielded, these hidden subsidies can be quite large
because the parties who are subject to regulatory taxes usually have no
place to go and, given the monopoly nature of the industry, no sure
knowledge of the magnitude of the subsidies created.
Removing this unified monopoly makes it hard to keep the cost
subsidies alive because they must now become more explicit and therefore
more vulnerable to attack. If and when an exit option becomes credible, the
source of the subsidy can be eroded, which is one of the reasons why
AT&T lost out in the long-distance market: it was burdened by consent
decree obligations that its rivals did not have to bear. More importantly,
even after the initial monopoly was broken up, we do not leave the world of
second-best. We still have to make some judgments as to which of the
many possible deviations from the competitive model will produce the
fewest distortions, both in the short term and the long run. In this
permanent second-best world, the question of system design becomes
critical precisely because the competitive solution--the more independent
firms, the merrier--does not apply. Rather, the increase in firm number
creates a more fragmented network. The costs of keeping the various
players together increases in ways that offset, at least in part, the benefits of
price competition by independent service providers. How the network is
configured therefore really matters, and it is here that it seems that the
long-term (permanent is too strong for this industry) result of the 1982
consent decree, and of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 17 it spawned, was
that it made the wrong bets on the structure of the future
telecommunications market, in large part because it underestimated the
transformative effect of improved technology on industry structure.18
17. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
18. The court noted:
Under [its customer service] provision, a competitor could interconnect with the
AT&T network only if the interconnection occurred in switching equipment
located on the customer's premises where the telecommunication originated or
terminated. The effect of this restriction was to prevent competitors from entering
the intercity market gradually, and thus effectively from entering the market at all.
For example, because of this restriction, a customer whose sole office was in St.
Louis could not choose to use the services of an AT&T competitor for part of a
route (e.g., from St. Louis to Chicago), and then AT&T's services for the
remainder of the route (e.g., from Chicago to Bethesda, Md.) because the St.
Louis customer did not have the "premises" in Chicago that AT&T required for
interconnection. Thus, to receive service for Bethesda as well as for Chicago, the
customer was required to purchase both services from AT&T.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161 n.123.
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In a sense, I think that this result was inevitable because of the
improbable alliance between Assistant Attorney General Baxter and Judge
Greene. On this occasion, at least, the Chicago school economist (who
taught at Stanford) and the progressive democrat were able to work out a
common solution on the thinnest of records. For the enormity of this
decree, its basis in antitrust law was feeble at best. The single specific
instance that provoked the separation was the unwillingness of AT&T to
provide forward transmission service that would allow MCI to
communicate with customers through Chicago if they did not have a
Chicago office. Hence, a phone call that started in St. Louis and was routed
to Bethesda, Maryland through Chicago could not use MCI or any other
provider for the first leg of the trip and AT&T for the second, unless it also
had a Chicago office. Dumb, to be sure, but the kind of issue that could be
resolved by having the FCC issue a simple interconnection order, without
restructuring the entire system, which, of course, the FCC could never do
without some specific congressional authorization.
Judge Greene did not look with favor on that modest alternative, with
consequences that soon became clear in unintended ways. This should not
come as a surprise, though, since, as a general matter, Judge Greene was
temperamentally skeptical of market solutions because he thought that
bigness and badness went hand in hand. His distrust of markets led him to
shy away from any minimalist approach to antitrust law. Rather, his
grander vision of the field was concerned more with large concentrations of
wealth than it was with market power-the ability to alter price and retain
sales. His heroes were not Robert Bork and Philip Areeda, but Arthur
Schlesinger and Ralph Nader.' 9 His sins may perhaps be forgiven since he
was a self-conscious dissenter to the Chicago School of antitrust. Less
forgivable, in a sense, was the failure of Assistant Attorney General Baxter,
excellent economist though he was, to be sufficiently skeptical about his
ability to understand the full range of structural imperfections that
permeated the telecommunications industry no matter how well configured.
He was too confident that he understood all that there was to know about
network industries, so he too did not seek to focus his remedies on the hold
up problems that were suggested by the two-legged telephone call.
Assistant Attorney General Baxter's major structural gambit was to
separate the long-lines operation from the local exchange carriers (LECs)
because of the risks of cross-subsidies that could otherwise take place in
order to block new entrants in the long-lines market. But he failed to see
that the elaborate structure that would be created would lead to other
tensions, including difficult issues over the relationships between the
various LECs and the inability to create effective parity between AT&T19. Seeid. at 164n.139, 165 n.141.
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which was subject to regulation under the consent decree-and other longlines carriers-which were not. Alas, he (and he was not alone) had no
conception of how complex the ratemaking issues could turn out to be.
Finally, neither Assistant Attorney General Baxter nor anyone else knew
how advances in technology would play into the various strictures of the
consent decree. Technical advances have a way of shortening the useful life
of institutional structures. The years after the 1982 decree saw the rise first
of the cell phone, and then of the Internet, both of which have wholly
transformed the nature of telecommunications by removing the last vestiges
of monopoly power that the LECs had over their respective territories. Yet
the entire structure of the 1982 decree and the 1996 telecommunications
statute were predicated on the assumption of the permanence of LEC
dominance.
Here is one story that helps make the point. As late as 1995 and 1996,
I consulted for (then) Bell Atlantic on issues like the application of the "bill
and keep" formula to interconnections between land lines and cell phones.
Even at that late date, most industry experts regarded cell phones as an
expensive luxury that they thought would not displace land lines, at least in
the foreseeable future. That is why the 1996 Telecommunications Act
treated the LECs as if they had a permanent chokehold over all land lines.
After all, the price for cell phone minutes was sufficiently high that most
people kept their cell phones turned off unless they wanted to make a call.
Most of the traffic between land lines and cell phones originated on cell
phones, which created an odd asymmetry in the market such that "bill and
keep" would have resulted in a substantial wealth transfer from LECs to
cell phone carriers. Yet, ten years later there were more cell phone lines
20
than land lines and the disparity has continued to widen since that time.
The land lines in the Epstein household, for example, have declined by fifty
percent, from two to one.
The subsequent mergers have shown just how wrong Assistant
Attorney General Baxter's original guess was. We have in place vertically
integrated networks that both compete and connect with each other. The
original structure under the decree has been undone by mergers and
technical advances. It is more than symbolic that Southwestern Bell, one of
the original Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), quickly
renamed itself SBC in order to shed its local image when it entered the
cellular and global markets. As one of the survivors of the massive

20. For example, by 2007, households with only cell phones outnumbered those with
only landlines. See Press Release, Mediamark Research Inc., Telecom Milestone: More
Cellphone-Only Than Landline-Only Households (Sept. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.mediamark.com (follow "Newsroom" hyperlink; then follow "2007 Press
Releases" hyperlink).
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consolidation within the industry-which neither Assistant Attorney
General Baxter nor Judge Greene could have foreseen or tolerated-it
acquired the struggling AT&T company, crippled as it was under the 1982
decree, only to change its name from SBC to AT&T. The value of the
brand transcended the value of the firm that owned it.

III. STRUCTURAL VERSUS CONDUCT REMEDIES
The unexpected twists and turns in the Bell consent decree raise a
theoretical question whose importance is undiminished today. What should
guide the choice between the use of structural or conduct remedies in
fashioning consent decrees more generally? To set the framework, it is
useful to recall the message that this distinction is intended to convey. A
structural remedy is most commonly sought in a monopolization case
brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act.2' It seeks to change the form
in which the regulated entities do business, by requiring, for example, the
breakup of a firm or spin off of a particular subsidiary. Once the structural
move is made, regulators may then put in place additional measures to
prevent the reformation of the original entity by subsequent corporate
maneuvers. These monopolization claims typically involve suits against
single firms charging them with a pattern of conduct that has allowed them
to acquire improperly a position of monopoly power within a certain
industry. The breakup of the Bell System was the outgrowth of a section 2
case, as was the major litigation in the Alcoa case,22 where the planned
breakup was averted by the creation of two new aluminum companiesReynolds and Kaiser-at the end of the Second World War. The structural
remedy was also employed in the endless pursuit which the United States
made of the hapless United Shoe Machinery Company. The effort took
place over a period that spanned close to seventy years, from the
completion of the merger in 1899 to its final dissolution in 1968 as a result
of the breakup which cast it into bankruptcy.23
The difficulty in dealing with these cases is that it is widely
understood that the acquisition of monopoly power, without more, is no
more a violation of the antitrust laws than it is a common law tort. Firms
that start from nothing and achieve their ends through excellence, acumen,

21. 26 Stat. 209, ch. 647 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. For an account of the case, see EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE: Wiry LESS ISMORE, 40-53 (2007). Some of the landmark cases were United

States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S.
32 (1918); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); United States v
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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and foresight are entitled to keep the fruits of their labor.24 That holds true
even if the integrated nature of their businesses makes it very difficult for
the new entrant to find a chink in the firm's armor that allows them to
acquire a foothold in the relevant line of business. One illustration of this
system was the conscious effort of United Shoe Machinery Company to
merge seven different companies in order to overcome the holdout
problems that arose when each firm held patents to equipment used at
different stages in the shoe production process. Putting all the companies
together in sequence was, in effect, an early version of a patent-pooling
device that effectively counteracted the extensive social waste from the
standard double marginalization problem.
To each such advance there is a hitch. The moment that one party is
able to smooth over the joints in a production sequence, it necessarily
disadvantages any competitor that sells equipment only in a single niche. It
has no particular comparative disadvantage when it faces no integrated
competition: mixing and matching is then inevitable. But it is hard to say
that this form of exclusion counts as an antitrust violation of any sort given
the net benefits to consumers from having this integrated option available.
The United States' strategy in these cases was to start with a conduct
remedy, by insisting that United Shoe Machinery Company not use any
sale or lease practice that prohibited outsiders from entering at one stage of
the production process.25 But owing to the convenience of the integrated
process, the preservation of these options did little to overcome the natural
efficiency advantage of United Shoe Machinery Company when it, and it
alone, could offer end-to-end service to consumers who were willing to pay
a premium for reliable service. United Shoe Machinery Company
continued to dominate the market, which led the Supreme Court to call for
its dissolution, the ultimate structural remedy.
Both remedies make no sense in the United Shoe Machinery
Company cases, and for the same reason: there should have been no
antitrust violation at all, so that the choice between bad conduct and a bad
structural remedy disappears. But if one remedy was worse than the other,
it was clearly the breakup decree. In fact, one of the risks associated with
the insistence of keeping certain contractual practices is that they loom far
larger in theory than they are valuable in practice, which is one reason why
I advocate a litigation strategy of unilateral surrender whenever contract

24. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429-30. Unfortunately, the Alcoa decision found ample
exception to this basic rule.
25. For a catalogue of forbidden clauses struck down, see, United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
258 U.S. at 456-57. For the earlier defense of this case see, United Shoe Mach. Co., 247
U.S. at 45; Winslow, 227 U.S. at 215-17.
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terms are challenged.2 6 But that surrender was not feasible in an age that
resolved all doubts about the scope of the antitrust laws in favor of their
application. All too often the Supreme Court would condemn practices that
it did not understand, or whose efficiency properties were apparent from
the record below. 27 The 1968 Supreme Court could not fathom how United
Shoe Machinery Company's ability to hold market share could be evidence
of its efficiency. Since the Court thought that United Shoe Machinery
Company's continued dominance had to be the result of a restrictive
practice, it ordered the firm to be broken up, given that lesser remedies had
repeatedly "failed." The Court did not then see that inability of a
competitor to break in at one stage is a private loss that does not positively
correlate with any systematic measure of the competitive misallocations of
concern to the antitrust laws. It is just this ultimate awareness of the
frequent misalignment of private and social losses that eventually led the
Supreme Court to hold that a patent does not supply conclusive evidence of
a legal monopoly in a tie-in case, given the competition from other patent
systems that require the same tie-in arrangements.28
IV. CONDUCT AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES FOR NETWORK
INDUSTRIES
United Shoe Machinery Company was only an integrated company.
At no point did it sell its products to downstream competitors. A
telecommunications company, however, could be in the position of
competing with its customers. Indeed, that situation could arise if the
original and integrated AT&T were ordered to sell services to competitors
in the long-distance markets. In that case, the pricing is no longer an
internal accounting device within one giant AT&T firm. Rather, it
represents a transfer of real dollars between unrelated entities. The firm that
overcharges the outsider could easily cover its tracks by charging identical
prices to its own downstream units. The upstream firm has its own costs,
which, when added to the costs of its inputs, result in a higher cost than the
single firm with the integrated product.29 This form of a "price squeeze" is
notoriously difficult to prove on the facts, even in unregulated industries,

26.

EPSTEIN,

ANTITRUST CONSENT

DECREES,

supra note 23, at 113 (noting the problem

for both United Shoe Machinery Company and Microsoft Corp.).
27. For the ultimate in per se violations see Topco Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 405
U.S. 596 (1972) (finding aper se violation from efficient buying cooperatives).
28. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (rejecting automatic
inference from valid patent to monopoly position in tie-in cases).
29. For the classic exposition of the permutation, see Town of Concord v. Boston
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990). In that case, Chief Judge Breyer, as he then was,
refused to accept the possibility of a price squeeze by a monopolist in a regulated industry,
given its inability to raise prices at will. Id.
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because the costs needed to produce complex goods and services are not
easily calculated given the prevalence of joint costs and the inevitable
difficulties in calculating marginal costs. But in the competitive context,
there is a respectable theoretical concern that the "equally efficient
competitor" will be unable to compete at the second stage of the business
because of the overcharge it faces from the monopolist that supplies it with
their initial input.
The 1982 Bell decree was fashioned in large measure to avoid these
serious problems, for which neither Judge Greene nor Assistant Attorney
General Baxter saw any conduct remedy. But the alternative substituted
one serious problem for another. Under the decree scheme, many phone
calls were routed through three separate companies: one LEC, one longline company, and a second LEC (some calls in an extended local regionthe so-called LATAs, or local access transfer area-were kept within a
single company). Given the strong restraints on entry, no telephone
company at the time could put together an alternative end-to-end package
of its own to take on the established firms. Now the pricing issues are real.
Assistant Attorney General Baxter's fatal miscalculation was to assume
that the risk of cross-subsidy when AT&T remained an integrated firm with
long-distance competitors was greater than the risk of mispricing access
charges when all long-distance carriers were independent of the LECs. His
choice of the structural remedy could not function like its ideal twin in a
competitive market in which the regulator is able to cut the new firm loose
and let it rip.3°
Most critically, this structural remedy required someone to regulate all
the various interconnections. Yet, as everyone immediately knew, the
judicial application of the antitrust law could not mount sufficient expertise
and firepower to deal with the pricing and access issues that Judge
Greene's structural decree forced to the fore. The ratemaking and access
chores had to be tackled by the FCC, which operated in tag-team style in
conjunction with Judge Greene's nonstop judicial oversight of its output,
backed by a team of experts from the Department of Justice. The complex
multi-stage process led to clear delays on innovation. But the bad structure
of the Bell consent decree put greater pressure on the conduct remedies.

30. Even that point was not always clear. In the famous consent decree in the Packers
Case, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), the original settlement not only
broke up the cartel within the meatpacking industry, but also prevented each of the
companies from competing separately in other markets, including agricultural processes.
The last restrictions were profoundly anticompetitive. In the 1932 litigation, Swift sought to
break the decree, but on that point was stoutly opposed by the grocery industry, which
profited from the consent decree bar. The modification was denied and, once again, the
antitrust law was pressed into service for anticompetitive ends. Id. For discussion, see
EPsTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES, supra note 23, at 22-29.
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The conduct remedy in this context says that the regulated party should
offer correct prices to its downstream rivals, and refrain from certain
practices that shore up its monopoly position. It is often unclear, though,
what that correct price should be, or which practices should be regarded as
anticompetitive. The antitrust law has a shot at controlling some of these
issues if there are certain contractual practices that it can sensibly ban, but
it is hopeless on dealing with rate issues and technological innovation, as
Assistant Attorney General Baxter and Judge Greene both understood.
At this point, the question is what other course of action could have
been taken in these cases which did not require the conduct remedy. In this
context, the first lesson that should have been learned from the previous
history of litigation under section 2 of the Sherman Act is that there is
something deeply incongruous in invoking the most potent remedystructural change-in circumstances where it is often difficult to get a clear
fix on the underlying liability. Stopping cartels from colluding gives the
best of both worlds, high social gain at low administrative cost, but these
cases are the low-hanging fruit.
The question is what should be done with more difficult cases, such as
telecommunications, where no competitive solution is possible, no matter
what the terms of the consent decree or settlement. The first point to
recognize here is that once we leave the AT&T monopoly model, some
form of regulation will prove necessary to deal with the question of
interconnections between the parties. In this regard, some of the
administrative turmoil associated with the 1982 breakup of the Bell System
was unavoidable. But there is still a question of how this should best be
done, to which there are two potential answers. The one chosen in 1982
created seven LECs and thus committed the system to a strong separation
between local and long-distance carriers. The alternative approach would
not have broken up AT&T, but would have required it to interconnect on
just and nondiscriminatory terms with any and all telecommunications
companies.
Here are two arguments in favor of the second option. First, this very
approach was slowly gaining traction in the FCC at the time of the breakup.
Indeed, Judge Greene acknowledged that FCC policy was tending in that
welcome direction by allowing both interconnection and resale, and sharing
of AT&T services. 3' The question, therefore, was why not continue with
31. In his opinion, Judge Greene noted:
It must be remembered that the regulatory decisions which introduced competition
into the interexchange market are themselves relatively recent. It was not until
1978 that the provision of regular long distance telephone service (i.e.,
MTS/WATS type service) became subject to competition.... The FCC decisions
allowing interexchange carriers to expand their service offerings by reselling and
sharing AT&T services have likewise been in force only for the last several years.
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the efforts to open up this network by taking one of these routes, preferably
through interconnection. Second, this approach was ultimately embedded
in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, in section 251, which creates a
general duty of telecommunications carriers "(1) to interconnect directly or
indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications
carriers; and (2) not to install network features, functions, or capabilities
that do not comply with the [applicable FCC guidelines and standards]. ',32
In order to make this system go, it is also necessary to impose a duty to
negotiate in good faith over the terms of the interconnections, which the
Act did,33 subject to a set of provisions that dealt with the negotiation,
arbitration, and approval of agreements, here done by state communications
commissions, subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the FCC.34
These provisions have provided the least controversy under the 1996 Act.
Indeed, virtually all the confusion under that Act came from the same mode
of aggressive intervention that undermined the effectiveness of the 1982
consent decree. The chief villain of the piece was section 25 1(c)(3), which
created an "additional" obligation that swamped the stated obligation by
forcing each of the carriers to sell off in bits and pieces the unbundled
network elements, which created endless disputes over pricing.35 There is
no point to restate the pathology here. Suffice it to say that the statute gave
a free option to the new entrant that a set of regulations were allowed to be
exercised in such a manner that if the entire network were sold off
piecemeal, the incumbent carrier could not recover the cost of its
investment.36 The ostensible benefit of this provision was that it prevented
needless duplication of network elements. Its far greater vice was its utter
inability to control the key pricing decisions. Sale at a forced valuation is
dangerous even in the simplest eminent domain context; it is far more
dangerous with tiny components of key switches.
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 172 n.172 (D.D.C.1982).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2000).
33. §251(c)(1).
34. § 252.
35. The statute reads:
Unbundled access. The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications
carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory
access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point
on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements
of this section and section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier
shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting
carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications
service.
§ 251(c)(3).
36. For a fuller account, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations:
Why the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315 (2005).
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The subsequent history shows the superiority of interconnection. Had
Judge Greene decided to stress that theme, the entire path of the
telecommunications industry would have been altered, and for much the
better. The key decisions on how to expand the network would be made by
market players with guaranteed entry and not through an administrative
process filled with major uncertainties and lengthy delays. One key
consequence of this new pattern would have been the more rapid rise of
cell phone use in the United States, which market actors could have
developed in connection with the existing network. This free entry
approach would, in principle, have allowed entry at both the local and the
long-distance level, or a combination of the two, at the discretion of the
applicant, not the judge. Unfortunately, the proper treatment of mobile
phones was nowhere mentioned in the backward-looking 1982 decree. 37 It
therefore fell to the fine art of legal interpretation to see whether, in the
end, they would be allocated to the LECs or treated as new competitive
elements in the long-distance side of the equation. At the time the decision
was made, the range of mobile telephony was limited so that all this
business was allocated to the RBOCs, just as if it had all the characteristics
of the last mile monopoly of the land phones.
Naturally, the high stakes led to extensive litigation. Judge Greene
held in 1986, four years into the decree, that the LATA boundaries were
applicable to cell phones and pager services, even though their technology
bore no relationship to the then-dominant land lines: there is no last mile
control for cell phones.38 That decision was, not surprisingly, overturned in
the court of appeals, which found no evidence in the decree or the
circumstances of its negotiation of an intention to so limit cellular
services. 39 But even with that appellate assist, the entire administrative path
was filled with potholes, for Judge Greene still remained at the helm, a
veritable one-man regulatory monopoly. Even though he routinely
approved requests for waivers from the LATA provisions, all this took time
(eight months for pager waivers and nineteen months for cellular
waivers). 40 These numbers are very large in a world in which the useful life
of some technical innovations is measured in months, not years.
It is important, therefore, to think about this entire episode from a
more structural perspective. If the 1982 decree had never undertaken
divestiture, but had made facilitation of new entry from any and all
37. See KELLOGG, THORNE & HUBER, supra note 8, at 46-47, for a terse account that
concluded thus: "The drafters of the decree simply blew it." But of course it is not so
simple. There are endemic limitations to the consent decree process.
38. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090 (D.D.C. 1986).
39. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
40. KELLOGG, THORNE & HUBER, supra note 8, at 677-686 (offering a detailed and
incisive account of these events).
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directions its sole objective, mobile phone technology could have skipped
over extensive obstacles to its widespread deployment. All the applicant
need do is show up for an interconnection hearing in order to be added to
the network. What it puts on its side of that interconnection is strictly its
own business. The phone company has no more control over that end use
than the electrical company has over the appliances that are attached to its
outlets. At a guess, earlier arrival of cellular could have hastened the
demise of the local exchange monopoly by perhaps a generation by
providing on a secure and rapid basis an alternative entry path into the
home. The entire episode shows that, notwithstanding the commendable
desire to break the old Bell monopoly, the 1982 decree contained many
structural limitations on innovation that could only warm the hearts of the
die-hard supporters of corporatism.
In a similar vein, the adoption of the interconnection approach would
have let the existing Bell System and any of its competitors provide
"information services,"' 1 including data processing, electronic publishing,
voice answering services, and electronic mail to their customers.42 Yet the
1982 decree gave the government and Judge Greene the opportunity to put
restrictions on the RBOCs, which they did based on the inchoate belief that
the RBOCs were capable of using their monopoly power to distort the
operation of this emerging market. How was never stated. In retrospect, the
entire episode starts from exactly the wrong premise. New and emerging
markets benefit from new entry, not from institutional prohibitions. The
most costly restrictions on entry come from those companies with the
greatest potential expertise on the relevant issue. The restriction here thus
hearkens back to the unwise provisions in the Packers case that kept the
various meatpacking companies out of key segments of the grocery
business. In 1991, this restriction was removed, but not until it had
generated endless rounds of pointless litigation.4 3 Once again, the
corporatist approach to new entry found a welcome home in the 1982
breakup decree.

V. A SUMMING UP
Any complete discussion of the Bell consent decree could take
volumes to complete. But it takes far less time to summarize the lesson.
The principle that should inform all exercises of government regulation is
that regulation is an evil until it can be shown to be a good. In this
particular instance, the rather hefty costs of implementing the 1982 decree
41. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (1982) (Decree § IV(J)).
42. For an exhaustive account, see KELLOGG, THORNE & HUBER,supra note 8, at 31527.
43. Id.
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should count as a substantial thumb on the scale. Robert Crandall estimates
that these direct costs ran to a tidy sum, but that the overall decline in
telephone costs per minute occurred more rapidly in the United States than
in Canada and the EU. This decline now hovers at about the same rate of
five to seven cents per minute, at least as of 2006."4 This one number
suggests that it would be hard to identify any systematic savings that came
out of a process that has been rich in litigation, but little else. More to the
point, none of these numbers deal with the interim delays in innovation that
are fairly attributable to the decree. The broad lesson here is that the choice
of remedial instruments really matters, often times more than the
perception that some degree of regulation is in fact needed. The 1982
decree introduced an unwieldy alliance between Judge Greene and the FCC
which helped set the course of regulation under the 1996
Telecommunications Act. None of these movements were wise, and all of
them could have been anticipated by regulators who started with the right
frame of mind, which favors modest steps over grand coups. A simple
interconnection approach is not the hallmark of a competitive market. But
it would surely have functioned far better than the complex schemes of
regulation that have controlled telecommunications in the United States
since the adoption of the 1982 Bell consent decree, now some twenty-six
long years ago.

44. Robert W. Crandall, The Brookings Inst., Presentation at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Center for Technology, Innovation, & Competition Symposium:
The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective (Apr.
18-19, 2008) (powerpoint slides on file with The Federal Communications Law Journal).
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